Is Japan Secretly Plotting a Attack Onthe Us Again Is Japan Supposed to Have a Army

There was never any chance that Japan would win Earth War II in the Pacific. When Japan attacked the United states of america at Pearl Harbor, information technology bit off more than it could chew. Japan reached the limits of its territorial expansion in the adjacent few months, and, from and so on, it was a steady rollback every bit Japanese forces were ousted from the Solomons, New Guinea, the Marianas, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

Subsequently Germany surrendered in May 1945, the full war effort was focused on the Pacific. Information technology was nominally an Centrolineal effort, but almost all of the forces endmost in on Japan were American. The Japanese Navy was gutted. What remained of Japanese airpower was generally kamikaze shipping, although at that place were thousands of them and plenty of pilots ready to fly on suicide missions. Nevertheless, Japan hung on with neat tenacity. It still had 4,965,000 regular army troops and more than in the paramilitary reserves.

Emperor Hirohito reviews Japanese troops in Tokyo in June 1941. Merely when Japan suffered severe hardship did his enthusiasm for the war begin to wane. (Bettmann/Corbis photograph)

The outcome of the war was sealed in 1944 when the United States obtained air bases in the Marianas. From there, B-29 bombers could reach Tokyo and all important targets in Japan. Nighttime afterwards night, the B-29s rained firebombs and high explosives on the wood and paper structures of Japan. On March ix, 1945, the bombers destroyed 16 square miles of Tokyo and killed 83,793 Japanese.

Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, predicted that the bombing would exist sufficient to prevail and "enable our infantrymen to walk aground on Nippon with their rifles slung." Adm. Ernest J. King, Main of Naval Operations, believed that encirclement, blockade, and bombardment would somewhen compel the Japanese to give up.

Others, notably Gen. George C. Marshall, the influential Army Master of Staff, were convinced an invasion would be necessary. In the summer of 1945, the United States pursued a mixed strategy: continuation of the bombing and blockading, while preparing for an invasion.

Nihon had concentrated its strength for a decisive defence force of the homeland. In June, Tokyo's leaders decided upon a fight to the finish, committing themselves to extinction before give up. As late as Baronial, Japanese troops past the tens of thousands were pouring into defensive positions on Kyushu and Honshu.

Old men, women, and children were trained with manus grenades, swords, and bamboo spears and were ready to strap explosives to their bodies and throw themselves under advancing tanks.

An invasion would almost certainly have happened had it not been for the successful test of the diminutive flop in the New United mexican states desert on July sixteen, an event that gave the United States a new strategic option.

The overall invasion plan was lawmaking-named Operation Downfall. In April 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff named Gen. Douglas MacArthur commander in chief of U.s. Army forces in the Pacific in add-on to his previous authorisation as commander in the Due south Pacific. He would lead the last assault on Nihon.

The invasion plan chosen for a Usa strength of 2.5 meg. Instead of being demobilized and going home, soldiers and airmen in Europe would redeploy to the Pacific. Forces already in the Pacific would exist joined by 15 Army divisions and 63 air groups from the European Theater.

Operation Downfall consisted of two parts:

Functioning Olympic. This invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's main islands, was ready for Nov. ane, 1945. It would exist an amphibious landing a 3rd larger than D-24-hour interval in Normandy. The expectation was that 9 U.s. divisions would be opposed by three Japanese divisions. (In fact, Nihon had 14 divisions on Kyushu.) Far E Air Forces would back up the invasion with 10 fighter groups, half dozen heavy flop groups, four medium flop groups, four low-cal flop groups, three reconnaissance groups, and three nighttime fighter squadrons. In addition, the B-29s would keep their strategic bombardment. MacArthur said the southern Kyushu landings would be conducted "under encompass of one of the heaviest neutralization bombardments by naval and air forces e'er carried out in the Pacific."

Operation Coronet. This was the code proper name for an invasion, in March 1946, of Honshu, the largest of the Japanese islands. Coronet would crave i,171,646 US troops, including a landing force of 575,000 soldiers and marines. It would be the largest invasion forcefulness e'er assembled. Performance Coronet would make use of airfields on Kyushu captured during Functioning Olympic.

Equally Japan's desperation grew, the ferocity of its armed resistance intensified. The lawmaking of bushido—"the fashion of the warrior"—was securely ingrained, both in the war machine and in the nation. Surrender was dishonorable. Defeated soldiers preferred suicide to life in disgrace. Those who surrendered were not deemed worthy of regard or respect. On Kwajalein atoll, the fatality rate for the Japanese force was 98.four percent. On Saipan, well-nigh 30,000—97 per centum of the garrison—fought to the death. On Okinawa, more than 92,000 Japanese soldiers in a forcefulness of 115,000 were killed.

Japan continued the fight with fanatical determination in the conventionalities that the willingness of soldiers and sailors to sacrifice their lives would compensate for shortfalls in military capability. The Ketsu-Get ("Decisive Functioning") defense programme for the homeland counted on civilians, including schoolchildren, taking part in the boxing.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of Centrolineal forces in the Southwest Pacific, wades ashore at the isle of Leyte, Philippines.

An Elusive Answer

Some 17 million persons had died at the hands of the Japanese empire between 1931 and 1945, and more would exist certain to die during the final stand.

Nihon had been controlled by the war machine since the 1930s. In 1945, power was vested in the "Large Six," the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. Members were the prime government minister, strange government minister, Army government minister (also called War Minister), Navy minister, chief of naval general staff, and master of the Regular army general staff. Ground forces and Navy ministers were fatigued from the ranks of serving officers. The dominant member of the Large 6 was the War Minister, Gen. Korechika Anami.

Emperor Hirohito, regarded as divine and revered as the embodiment of the Japanese state, was supposedly to a higher place politics and regime. In fact, he was interested in, and well-informed about, both of them. His enthusiasm for the state of war did not wane until the bombs and hardship reached Nihon.

On March 18, Hirohito toured the areas of Tokyo firebombed March 9 and ten; he ended that the state of war was lost and that Japan should seek an end to it equally presently as possible. However, Hirohito agreed with the strategy of waiting to negotiate until Japan won a big boxing, strengthening its bargaining position.

The prime minister was Kantaro Suzuki, a retired admiral, who sometimes sided with the council's peace faction but aligned frequently with the military machine hardliners, who dominated meetings and policy.

Japan still held virtually of the territory it had captured in Asia and Indochina, and hoped to keep some of information technology. Its remaining military strength was considerable. If it could inflict painful casualties on the United States, Japan might exist able to secure favorable terms, it idea.

Today, a fierce argument still rages most what the casualty toll might accept been if the Operation Downfall invasion had taken identify. The answer is elusive. Wartime casualty estimates were based on inaccurate assumptions—usually low—almost enemy strength. Postwar analysis has been severely distorted by academicians and activists on the American left seeking to show that neither an invasion of Japan nor the atomic bomb was necessary to cease the war.

Subsequently the state of war, President Truman said that Marshall told him at Potsdam (July 1945) that the invasion would cost "at a minimum one-quarter of a meg casualties, and might price every bit [many] as a million, on the American side alone." For this, Truman was ridiculed. There is no independent evidence of what Marshall said at Potsdam. Truman may take been embellishing it, just his numbers were non preposterous, every bit is ofttimes alleged.

In fact, Joint Staff planners on two occasions worked upwards prey estimates and came out in the aforementioned range. In August 1944, using prey rates from fighting on Saipan as a basis, they said that "it might cost us a half-million American lives and many times that number in wounded" to take the Japanese home islands. An April 1945 written report projected casualties of 1,202,005—including 314,619 killed and missing—in Operations Olympic and Coronet, and more if either of the campaigns lasted more than ninety days.

MacArthur's staff made several estimates for Operation Olympic, one for 125,000 casualties in the first 120 days and some other for 105,000 casualties in the commencement 90 days. Marshall sent MacArthur a strong hint about Truman's business near casualties, whereupon MacArthur, who wanted the invasion to go forward, backed abroad from the estimates, declaring them too loftier.

At a critical White House meeting on June 18, Marshall gave his opinion that casualties for the first xxx days on Kyushu would not exceed the 31,000 sustained in a similar menstruum of the boxing for Luzon in the Philippines. (Marshall took that number from an inaccurate report. Casualties for the first 30 days on Luzon had been 37,900.) Others at the coming together based their estimates on Okinawa, where US casualties were about 50,000.

Gen. Korechika Anami, Nippon's War Government minister, opposed the surrender but would non go against the Emperor. (Bettmann/Corbis photograph)

(To put these numbers in some perspective, the losses for the Normandy invasion, from D-Day through the first 48 days of gainsay in Europe, were 63,360.)

Neither comparing was apt. The Japanese forces on Luzon and Okinawa were a fraction of the size of the forcefulness waiting in the habitation islands. As Marshall and other military machine leaders were about to learn, they had drastically underestimated the strength of the Japanese defenses on Kyushu and Honshu.

US intelligence agencies had long since cleaved Nihon'southward secret codes. "Magic" was the proper noun given to intelligence from intercepted diplomatic communications, and "Ultra" was intelligence from Japanese Army and Navy letters. From these intercepts, it was known that Japan intended to fight to the terminate.

On June 15, an intelligence estimate had reported six combat divisions and two depot divisions, a total of almost 350,000 men, on Kyushu. However, beginning in July, Ultra intercepts revealed a much larger forcefulness, with new divisions moving into place.

Subsequent reports raised the estimated number of troops, offset to 534,000 so to 625,000. That about doubled the June guess, merely it was yet likewise depression. In authenticity, Japan had 14 combat divisions with 900,000 troops on Kyushu, full-bodied in the southern office of the island around the Olympic landing beaches. The American strength committed to Kyushu was 680,000, of which 380,000 were combat troops. Japanese forces were being pulled back into Honshu as well. Between January and July, military forcefulness in the home islands doubled, from 980,000 to 1,865,000.

The Bombs Fall

Would the United States accept pressed alee with Operation Downfall anyway? If and so, casualties would be much college than predicted. If not, Tokyo would accept won its bet that the United States would back down if the price in American lives could be fabricated high plenty.

Information technology did non come to the test. The prey estimates were never updated to accept the Ultra intercepts into account. On Aug. 4, the war plans committee of the Articulation Chiefs of Staff suggested reviewing the plan in view of the Japanese buildup, merely by then the decision had been made to drop the diminutive bomb.

The first diminutive bomb brutal on Hiroshima on Aug. 6. Japanese officials understood what it was; Nippon had itself been working on a fission bomb. The Large Half-dozen shrugged off the loss and held their position.

When the 2nd atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki Aug. nine, the Navy primary, Adm. Soemu Toyoda, argued that the US could not have much radioactive cloth left for more atomic bombs. The hardliners refused to consider surrendering unless the Allies agreed that Japanese forces could disarm themselves, that in that location would be no prosecution for war crimes, and that at that place would exist no Allied occupation of Japan.

War Minister Anami said the armed forces could commit ii,350,000 troops to keep the fight. In add-on, commanders could telephone call on four 1000000 civil servants for war machine duty.

The Soviet Matrimony declared war on Japan Aug. 8, which put pressure on the Big Six from a unlike direction. The Japanese had hoped, without audio reasons or encouragement, that they could cut a deal with the Soviets to counterbalance the Americans and permit the Japanese to continue some of their conquered territory.

On Aug. 10, the Foreign Ministry, interim on approval of the Emperor, sent notice to the US and the Allies that Japan could accept the demand for surrender if "prerogatives" of the Emperor were not compromised. The United States replied that the authority of the Emperor would be subject to the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers. The hardliners dug in, and the peace faction cruel into disarray. Vice Adm. Takijiro Onishi, vice principal of the naval general staff, declared: "If we are prepared to sacrifice 20 million Japanese lives in a special attack [kamikaze] effort, victory will be ours."

As the earth watched and waited, Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commanding US Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, redirected the B-29 force away from the firebombing of cities to precision assault of military targets, peculiarly transportation. Marshall and his staff were studying an alternate strategy, to use diminutive bombs in directly support of invasion. The United States expected to have at to the lowest degree vii bombs by Oct. 31. They were told by Manhattan Project scientists that lethal radiological effects from an atomic bomb would reach out 3,500 feet only that the basis would exist safe to walk on in an hour.

The impasse was cleaved by the Emperor who decided to surrender and announce his conclusion to the Japanese people in the form of an "Imperial Rescript" broadcast on the radio.

Army and Navy officers put up fierce resistance. Some attempted to destroy the recorded rescript before broadcast. The commander of the Purple Guard, who would not go on with the plot, was assassinated by Army hotheads. They tried to observe and kill Suzuki too. They attempted to persuade Anami—who was opposed to the surrender but would non oppose the Emperor—to bring together in a coup. Had he done so, the surrender might have failed, but Anami committed suicide instead.

A mushroom cloud rises over the Japanese metropolis of Nagasaki on Aug. ix, 1945, iii days after the first atomic flop struck Hiroshima.

Enter the Revisionists

The Emperor'south rescript was circulate at noon on Aug. fifteen, and the war was over.

There was some criticism of the utilise of the atomic bomb in the firsthand postwar menstruum, simply it was in the 1960s that the "revisionist" school of historians emerged, aggressively disquisitional of the United States and challenging the necessity and motive for using the diminutive bomb.

The key revisionist claim is that the atomic bombs were non necessary and that, fifty-fifty without them, the war soon would have been over. Nippon was on the verge of surrender. The United states of america prolonged the war by insisting on unconditional surrender and dropped the diminutive bombs mainly to impress and intimidate the Russians. In any instance, the casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan were exaggerated.

The latest in the revisionist repertory is Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Nihon (2005) past Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, professor of history at University of California, Santa Barbara. "Americans withal cling to the myth that the diminutive bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided the knockout dial," Hasegawa said. "The myth serves to justify Truman'south decision and ease the collective American conscience."

A regular part of the revisionist litany is recitation of wartime opinions of Army Air Forces leaders, including Arnold and Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who thought the state of war could have been brought to an terminate past conventional bombing. They ignore LeMay'south later assessment that "the atomic bomb probably saved three million Japanese and perchance a meg American casualties."

Revisionists like to cite the US Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946, which said the Japanese would probably take surrendered by Nov. i, fifty-fifty if Russia had not entered the war and fifty-fifty if no invasion was planned. The survey is not nearly equally authoritative a product as the title sounds and its conclusions are reverse to the overwhelming weight of bear witness.

It is reasonable to consider several factors as contributing to the surrender—bombing and blockade, Soviet entry into war, the impending invasion—but the Emperor'south conclusion was cardinal.

When Hirohito told his advisors that he intended to surrender, he gave three reasons: bombing and blockade, inadequate provisions to resist invasion, and the atomic bombs. He said on Aug. 14 that "a peaceful end to the state of war is preferable to seeing Japan annihilated."

In the Imperial Rescript of Surrender, he said, "The enemy has begun to use a new and near cruel bomb, the power of which to exercise damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives." Hirohito, at a coming together with Mac-Arthur Sept. 27, 1945 said, "The peace party did not prevail until the bombing of Hiroshima created a situation which could be dramatized."

Japan was non ready to surrender prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs. Without them, the state of war would accept gone on. Those who think otherwise seriously underestimate Japan'due south rest strength and determination.

Bombing and blockade would take eventually concluded the war at some point just were non probable to take washed so anytime soon. The B-29 firebombing would probably have resumed, and two nights of information technology on a par with March 9 would have exceeded the death toll of both atomic bombs.

Functioning Olympic would well-nigh likely have gone forward against a Japanese force with 600,000 more troops than previously estimated on Kyushu—and that would have left the invasion of Honshu and Operation Coronet yet to come up.

In the finish, Japan would accept been defeated, but the cost in lives on both sides would have been terrible.

John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Strength Magazine for 18 years and is now a contributing editor. His most recent article, "Doolittle's Raid," appeared in the Apr issue.

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Source: https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0609invasion/

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